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The capacity to accurately evaluate the causal effectiveness of our actions is key to successfully adapting to changing environments. Here
we scanned subjects using functional magnetic resonance imaging while they pressed a button to earn money as the response–reward
relationship changedover time. Subjects’ judgments about the causal efficacy of their actions reflected the objective contingencybetween
the rate of button pressing and the amount of money they earned. Neural responses in medial orbitofrontal cortex and dorsomedial
striatum were modulated as a function of contingency, by increasing in activity during sessions when actions were highly causal com-
pared with when they were not. Moreover, medial prefrontal cortex tracked local changes in action–outcome correlations, implicating
this region in the on-line computation of contingency. These results reveal the involvement of distinct brain regions in the computational
processes that establish the causal efficacy of actions, providing insight into the neural mechanisms underlying the adaptive control of
behavior.
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Introduction
The capacity of humans and other animals to detect the causal
effect of their actions on environmental events is a critical deter-
minant of adaptive behavior allowing the acquisition and perfor-
mance of new and existing behavioral strategies to be regulated by
their consequences (Dickinson and Balleine, 1993; Balleine and
Dickinson, 1998, 2000). The on-line detection of changes in the
causal efficacy of actions relies on the computation of temporal
correlations between the rate of performance and the occurrence
of environmental events, particularly the relationship between
actions and motivationally significant events such as rewards
(Baum, 1973; Dickinson, 1994; Dickinson and Balleine, 1994).
Because responding is effortful, it is of considerable advantage for
animals to encode the likelihood that an action will result in a
valued consequence and so increase performance when that like-
lihood is high or reduce performance if it is low. Contingency is
the term used by behavioral psychologists to describe the rela-
tionship between an action and its consequences or outcome,
which is defined in terms of the difference between two probabil-
ities: the probability of the outcome given the action is performed
and the probability of the outcome given the action is not per-
formed (Hammond, 1980; Beckers et al., 2007). Sensitivity to
contingency has been shown to be a key feature of goal-directed
behavior in rodents, and, at a neural level, recent evidence sug-
gests that this capacity is mediated by a corticobasal ganglia cir-
cuit involving the prelimbic region of ratmedial prefrontal cortex
and the dorsomedial striatum (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998;
Corbit and Balleine, 2003; Yin et al., 2005). Analyses based on a
constellation of deficits observed in patients with damage to the
frontal lobe have generated the suggestion that particularly the
prefrontal cortex plays a general role in planning and perhaps the
encoding of goal-directed action (Milner, 1982; Bechara et al.,
1994; Rolls et al., 1994), although whether these structures are in
fact involved in the on-line encoding of the contingent or indeed
the causal relation between action and outcome has not been
addressed.
The goal of this investigation was to determine the neural sub-
strates of contingency detection in humans, togetherwith its subjec-
tive concomitant: the subject’s judgment of the causal effectiveness
of his/her own actions. To achieve this, we forsook the traditional
trial-based approach, typically used in experiments using humans
and nonhuman primates, in which subjects are cued to respond at
particular times in a trial, for the unsignaled, self-paced approach
moreoftenused in studiesof associative learning in rodents inwhich
the subjects themselves choose when to respond. This approach al-
lowed us to assay a subject’s behavioral sensitivity to changes in the
contingencybetweenrespondingandrewards, and tomeasure [with
blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging(fMRI)]neural responses related todetectionof these
contingencies.
Materials andMethods
Subjects. Fourteen healthy right-handed volunteers (seven males and
seven females) participated in the study. The volunteers were preassessed
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to exclude those with a previous history of neurological or psychiatric
illness. All subjects gave informed consent, and the study was approved
by the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technol-
ogy. One subject was later excluded from the analysis because of a com-
plete lack of responding on one of the schedules.
Experimental procedures. To maximize experimental variability in the
response–reward contingencies experienced by our subjects, we used two
different types of reward schedule: variable-ratio (VR) schedules, in
which subjects were rewarded according to the number of responses
performed, and variable-interval (VI) schedules, wherein subjects were
rewarded not in proportion to the number of responses made, but ac-
cording to the interval between successive rewards. Because of method-
ological constraints imposed by the fMRI method, we randomly inter-
spersed 30 s blocks of responding on these different schedules with rest
periods (“REST” block) (Fig. 1A), which were explicitly cued to the
subjects. Otherwise, responding was self-paced and unconstrained dur-
ing the “active” periods (“RESPOND” block). The order of presentation
of the blocks was randomized throughout.
Within each block of responding, subjects were invited to freely press
a button as often as they liked to obtainmonetary rewards, which were in
25 cent units distributed according to four schedules of reinforcement
(Fig. 1B): a VR10 schedule, inwhich subjects are rewarded on average for
every 10 responses; a VI4 schedule, in which subjects are reinforced on
average every 4 s; aVR-yoked schedule, inwhich the number of responses
to reward was yoked to those pertaining to the number of responses
made for reinforcement during performance of the VI4 schedule from
the preceding subject; and a VI-yoked schedule, in which subjects were
reinforced according to the intervals to reward experienced by the pre-
ceding subject during performance of the VR10 schedule.
At the end of each session, subjects were asked to rate how causal their
actions were, i.e., whether making a response caused them to receive
money, using a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicated not causal and 100
indicated strongly causal. Subjects completed four sessions of 5min, each
associated with a specific schedule the order of which was counterbal-
anced across subjects.
In this study, we used both variable-ratio and short variable-interval
schedules to allow subjects to sample across a broad contingency space to
create variance in both subjective causality judgment and objective con-
tingency. The decision to use both variable-ratio and variable-interval
schedules was based on previous findings in rodents suggesting that these
schedules produce the greatest variation in the experienced action–out-
come contingency (Dickinson et al., 1983; Dawson andDickinson, 1990;
Dickinson, 1994). This variability in contingency is partly explained by
the fact that interval schedules typically decouple response rate and re-
ward rate, leading to a lower contingency on those schedules, particularly
compared with ratio schedules, which, by virtue of the tight coupling
between response rate and rewards, can lead to
a higher contingency estimates.However, in the
present study we did not find either consistent
or significant differences in the degree of con-
tingency or in causality judgment across these
schedules, largely because we used rather short
intervals in the VI schedules (VI4), so as to
match the inter-reinforcement interval as
closely as possible to the low VR (VR10) sched-
ules. Therefore, instead of comparing across
schedules, we took advantage of intrinsic vari-
ability in the degree of contingency across
schedules within subjects, by comparing re-
sponses elicited on schedules with high and low
objective contingencies within each subject re-
gardless of which schedule fell into these cate-
gories between subjects.
Imaging procedures. A 3 Tesla scanner
(MAGNETOM Trio; Siemens) was used to ac-
quire both structural T1-weighted images and
T2*-weighted echoplanar images (repetition
time 2.81 s; echo time 30 ms; flip angle
90°; 45 transverse slices; matrix 64 64; field
of view  192 mm; thickness  3 mm; slice
gap 0 mm) with BOLD contrast. To recover signal loss from dropout
in themedial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) (O’Doherty et al., 2002), each
horizontal section was acquired at 30° to the anterior commissure–pos-
terior commissure axis.
Data analysis. We used SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Imaging
Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK) for preprocessing
and statistical analyses. The first four volumes of images were discarded
to avoid T1 equilibrium effects. The images were realigned to the first
image as a reference, spatially normalized with respect to the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) echoplanar imaging template, and spatially
smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (8 mm, full width at half-maximum).
We used high-pass filter with cutoff 200 s.
For each subject, we constructed an fMRI design matrix by modeling
each “respond” period within a session as a 30-s-long block. To allow for
initial learning and stabilization of responding, we modeled the first
RESPOND block separately from the other four RESPOND blocks. Be-
havioral analysis confirmed no significant differences between the sec-
ond and fifth blocks (using paired t tests) on a range of behavioral mea-
sures including response number, response rate, number of responses
per reinforcer, intervals per reinforcer, and total reinforcers obtained,
confirming that learning effects were stable by the end of the first RE-
SPOND block and thereby justifying our inclusion of the last four blocks
as representative of stable responding sessions. These regressors were
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. Motion
parameters were entered as additional regressors to account for residual
effects of head motion. The design matrix was then regressed against the
fMRI data to generate parameter estimates for each subject. Contrasts of
parameter estimates between sessions were then entered into a subse-
quent between-subject analysis to generate group-level random-effects
statistics. All coordinates indicate the MNI coordinate system.
To compute the objective contingency for each schedule as experi-
enced by the subjects, we divided up each session into 10 s bins and
counted the number of responses performedwithin each 10 s bin and the
number of outcomes received in each bin. We then tabulated these two
variables and computed the overall correlation across bins between the
number of responsesmade and the number of outcomes received per bin
across the whole session. Those schedules with a high correlation coeffi-
cient are, therefore, those with a high contingency between the rate of
change of responding over time and the rate of reward delivery, whereas
schedules with a lower correlation generate a weaker response–reward
contingency.
For the correlation analyses reported in Figure 3, D and E, we per-
formed a more fine-grained analysis of the local computation of contin-
gencywithin each 10 s interval of responding for the subjects.We divided
each 10 s time window into 200 ms bins and created two vectors (of
Figure 1. Experimental task.A, Example of the structure of a single session. Each experiment consisted of four sessions lasting
5min each. A single session includes five “RESPOND” blocks, in which the subject made button presses, and five “REST” blocks. At
the endof each session, subjects ratedhowcausal their buttonpresseswere in earningmoney on a scale from0 to 100.B, Example
of the event schedule of the RESPONDblock.When the subject pressed the button, the stimulus on the screen turned yellow for 50
ms. Reward (25 cents) was delivered at the first button press after the 10th response (on average) on the VR10 schedule.
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length 50), one for responses and one for rewards. We entered the num-
ber of responses that occurred in each 200 ms bin within the interval. If
no response occurred within that bin, a zero was entered. Because of the
short time length of the bin, for each bin usually either no response
occurred or a single response occurred. Similarly, for the reward vector,
we entered for each bin the number of rewards obtained in that 200 ms
interval and zero otherwise.We then computed a correlation between the
number of responses and rewards obtained in each bin across the 10 s
interval.
We computed the correlation between the number of responses per-
formed and the number of rewards obtained for each 200 ms bin across
every 10 s time window. We then extracted the BOLD signal averaged
across those voxels in each region of interest found to show significant
effects in the contrast of high  low objective contingency at p  0.01,
and averaged the resulting time series into 10 s bins. We next performed
a regression analysis of the binned BOLD data against the local objective




We found a highly significant correlation between objective con-
tingency and subjective causality ratings calculated across all sub-
jects and sessions (R2 0.63; p 0.5 105) (Fig. 2). To assess
this result further, we took the schedule with the highest and
lowest objective contingency measure for each subject and com-
pared their associated causality judgments (the specific schedules
assigned to each condition for each subject are listed in supple-
mental Table 1, available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental
material). The high-contingency schedules (65.8 5.3; mean
SE) were associated with significantly higher causality judgments
than the low-contingency schedules (41.5 7.2), across subjects
(t  3.771; df  12; p  0.005, one-tailed paired t test). These
results suggest that subjects were sensitive to relative changes in
contingency and that this was reflected in their subjective causal-
ity judgments. It is possible, however, that the different schedules
induced other effects that could have produced the changes in
causality and, to assess this, we also compared other possible
differences between the contingencies that could potentially have
influenced the results, including the intervals between successive
rewards (high, 4.21  0.94; low, 5.23  0.77), the number of
responses made per reward (high, 9.35 0.97; low, 10.7 1.2),
and the total number of rewards obtained (high, 357 45; low,
274 35).None of thesemeasures showed significant differences
as a function of contingency (at p 0.05 in paired t tests), helping
to rule out confounding explanations for the subsequent imaging
results. Response rates and variability in response rates across
each session are shown in supplemental Figures 1 and 2, respec-
tively (available at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
Paired t tests revealed no significant difference in the overall re-
sponse rates (high, 2.74  0.30; low, 2.24  0.34), nor in the
variance in response rates (high, 0.695  0.092; low, 0.685 
0.094) as a function of contingency (high vs low).
fMRI results: effects of contingency
We next contrasted the average evoked BOLD signal during the
high-contingency schedule with that elicited during the low-
contingency schedule, to detect brain regions showing changes in
activity as a function of differences in objective contingency. We
found that three regions in particular showed significant effects
of contingency: themedial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) [significant
at p  0.05, corrected for small volume (SVC)] (Fig. 3A), the
mOFC ( p 0.05, SVC) (Fig. 3B), and the dorsomedial striatum
(specifically anterior medial caudate nucleus; p  0.001 uncor-
rected) (Fig. 3C) (see supplemental Table 2, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
We then looked at a finer 200 ms time scale to see how neural
activity in our regions found to be sensitive to contingency
changed over time as a function of local fluctuations in the cor-
relation between responses and rewards during performance.We
computed the local objective contingency within each 10 s time
interval of task performance, by counting the number of re-
sponses and rewards in 200 ms bins within that interval, and
computing the contingency across the whole 10 s window be-
tween these variables (seeMaterials andMethods).We computed
the correlation between average evoked BOLD signal in each 10 s
window and the local objective contingency from each of the
areas that we previously found to be sensitive to contingency, and
we found a highly significant correlation between the local objec-
tive contingency and averaged BOLD signal in only one of three
of the areas: the mPFC (R2  0.72; p  0.0021) (Fig. 3D). No
significant correlations were found in the other two regions. Al-
though mPFC is known to also respond to receipt of rewarding
outcomes (Elliott et al., 1997; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Knutson et
al., 2003), therewas no significant correlation between the overall
reward rate and activity in this area (R2 0.053; p 0.62) (Fig.
3E), ruling that out as a potential explanation for our results.
These findings suggest, therefore, that the medial prefrontal cor-
tex is involved in the on-line computation of contingency.
fMRI results: subjective causality
Finally, we tested for areas showing changes in activity related
directly to the subjects’ own subjective causality ratings over ses-
sions. A comparison between schedules with high comparedwith
low causality ratings revealed significant effects in themPFC (Fig.
4A). Although many other areas were also activated in this con-
trast (supplemental Table 3, available at www.jneurosci.org as
supplemental material), a plot of the parameter estimates for
each of the activated areas revealed that mPFC was one of only
three regions showing a linearly increasing response profile as a
function of increasing causality judgments across all of the four
sessions for each subject (the other two regions showing linear
changes with causality are lateral OFC and a more dorsomedial
area of prefrontal cortex shown in supplemental Fig. 3, available
at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). This result sug-
gests that mPFC is not only involved in computing the local
objective contingency between responding and rewards, but that













Figure 2. Plot of causality value against global objective correlation.
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activity in this area also tracks subjective judgments about the
causal effectiveness of a subject’s own behavior.
Discussion
Our findings implicate a network of brain regions involving the
medial prefrontal cortex, medial orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsal
striatum (specifically anterior medial caudate nucleus) in com-
puting the causal effectiveness of an individual’s own behavior
(Balleine, 2005; Balleine and Ostlund, 2007). These findings sug-
gest that this network of brain regions may be responsible for the
adaptive control of action selection in situations in which the
temporal relationship between actions performed and rewards
obtained vary over time. Sensitivity to the contingency between
actions and reward delivery is indicative of goal-directed or ac-
tion–outcome learning in rats (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998).
Thus, the areas identified in the present study are also candidate
regions for mediating goal-directed action selection in humans.
The results of the present study also demonstrate the utility of
using a free-operant paradigm to study human instrumental
learning. Typically in the human and indeed nonhuman primate
literature, action selection is studied in a trial-based manner, in
which after the onset of a cue, a single response is triggered.
However, in the free-operant case, responding is unsignaled and
self-generated, thereby allowing us to explore themeans bywhich
subjects can modulate their responses as a function of changes in
reward contingencies over time, an issue not easily addressable
through standard trial-based approaches. Furthermore, the de-
gree of similarity between the free-operant approach used here
and that typically used in rodents makes it possible to build
bridges between these two literatures and establish the degree of
homology between the brain systems mediating instrumental
learning in rodents and humans.
Our results suggest distinct contributions for different parts of
prefrontal cortex and striatum in implementing goal-directed
behavior. Whereas mOFC and dorsomedial striatum were more
engaged by situations with a high compared with a low contin-
gency, suggestive of a role for these regions in mediating control
of behavior by the goal-directed system, the mPFC, was also
found to be sensitive to changes in local contingency between
responding and reward delivery, suggesting that this region may
play a direct role in the on-line computation of contingency.
These findings raise the interesting possibility that the corticos-
triatal circuitry involved in computing the causal efficacy of ac-
tionsmay be anatomically distinct from those circuits involved in
using that knowledge to select and implement a course of action.
The fact that mPFC contained representations of on-line causal-
ity, whereas dorsomedial striatum did not contain these repre-
sentations but nevertheless was modulated by contingency, sug-
gests that in this case, signals in mPFC might be used to guide
activity in its dorsomedial striatal target area. Similarly, an inter-
action has been described previously between prefrontal cortex
and dorsomedial striatum in a rather different task context, albeit
Figure 3. A–C, Voxels showing significant correlations with the global objective correlation
in themPFC [(x, y, z) (6, 52,10); p 0.05, SVC with a 5mm sphere centered at (6, 57,
6) (Hampton et al., 2006); A], mOFC [(x, y, z) (2, 30,20); p 0.05, SVCwith a 5mm
sphere centered at (3, 36,24) (Valentin et al., 2007); B], and dorsomedial striatum [ante-
rior caudate nucleus; (x, y, z) (6, 10, 20); p 0.001, uncorrected; C]. Bar plots show param-
eter estimated at each peak voxel sorted by global objective correlation. D, Plot of averaged
BOLD signal extracted from mPFC, against the local objective correlation and regression slope
(R 2 0.72; p 0.0021). E, Plot of averaged BOLD signal extracted from mPFC against rein-
forcement rate and regression slope (R 2 0.053; p 0.62). Error bars 1 SEM.
Figure 4. Voxels showing significant activation in the high-causality condition in the mPFC
[(x, y, z) (10, 50,10); p 0.001, uncorrected], and parameter estimates sorted at the
peak voxel of the mPFC by causality value. Error bars 1 SEM.
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running in the converse direction to that proposed here (Pasupa-
thy and Miller, 2005).
A number of previous studies have reported a role for dorsal
striatum in processes related to contingency learning in humans.
Delgado et al. (2005) used a trial-based approach to changes in
neural activity over time while subjects learned instrumental as-
sociations. Activity in caudate at the time of choice was found to
be present during initial learning of contingencies, but decreased
over time as subjects learned the contingent relationship between
responses and outcomes. Tricomi et al. (2004) reported an in-
crease in activity in this area while subjects perceived an instru-
mental contingency compared with when no such contingency
was perceived, even though subjects were in actuality always in a
noncontingent situation. The present study demonstrates that
caudate is directly modulated as a function of the degree of ob-
jective contingency, that is, in situations in which contingency is
high, activity in this region is increased, comparedwith situations
in which contingency is low.
Another important feature of our data is that we found both
commonalities and differences in the brain systems exhibiting
sensitivity to objective contingency and those responding to sub-
jective causality judgments. Although the same region of medial
prefrontal cortex was found to respond to both, areas such as
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and lateral orbitofrontal cortex
that were found to be active in relation to subjective causality
judgments did not show significant objective contingency effects,
whereas dorsal striatum andmedial orbitofrontal cortex found in
the objective contingency contrast did not show up in the subjec-
tive causality contrast. The differences in the areas engaged in
these two contrasts may relate to the fact that although subjective
contingency is significantly correlatedwith objective contingency
behaviorally, the correlation is by no means perfect, and thus the
differences in the results obtained may highlight differences in
the network of brain regions responsible for evaluating subjective
awareness of causality from those involved in computing objec-
tive contingencies. These findings suggest that the brain systems
involved inmediating subjective awareness of contingencies may
be at least partly dissociable from brain systems involved in using
knowledge of those contingencies to guide behavior.
Another notable feature of our data is the overall decrease in
activation in the RESPOND phase compared with the REST
phase in mOFC and mPFC (but not in striatum). This effect
might relate to the suggestion that ventral mPFC is part of a
network of brain regions that increase in activationwhen subjects
are at rest, the so called “default” network (Gusnard et al., 2001).
However, although this effect may account for the overall differ-
ences in activation between RESPOND and REST periods in
these regions, it is unlikely that differences observed in these areas
as a function of contingency within the RESPOND period across
sessions could also be explained by this phenomenon: no signif-
icant differences were found in overall response rates or re-
sponses per reinforcer in high- compared with low-contingency
conditions, suggesting that the degree of task-related effort ex-
erted is equivalent across these conditions.
Although neural responses in a number of brain regions, in-
cluding orbitofrontal cortex, but in addition amygdala and ven-
tral striatum, have previously been found to be related to ex-
pected future reward in relation to the presentation of particular
cues or stimuli, these studies are likely to be probing brain sys-
tems involved in stimulus–outcome learning, in which associa-
tions between a given context and the reward presented in that
context are learned, regardless of whether an action is performed
or not and, even if an action is performed, whether or not that
action is contingent on reward delivery (Schoenbaum et al., 1998;
Gottfried et al., 2002, 2003; Paton et al., 2006). Such stimulus–
outcome processes may be always present during instrumental
conditioning alongside action–outcome and stimulus–response
learning components. However, the results of the present study
are unlikely to be attributable to encoding of stimulus–outcome
relationships; no discriminative stimuli were used to signal
whether or not an outcomewould be delivered at any given point
in time, other than the performance of the actions themselves.
Although in principle the interval between rewards could act as a
form of temporal cue to reward delivery, the fact that no signifi-
cant difference was found in the mean intervals between rewards
in the high- and low-contingency conditions helps to rule out
that explanation for the difference in activation observed be-
tween these two conditions.
Habitual or stimulus–response learning processes are also
known to be engaged during instrumental conditioning (Dickin-
son and Balleine, 1993). However, when behavior is under con-
trol of the habitual system, rats become insensitive to changes in
contingency between actions and outcome, such that responding
persists on an action even if the outcome is no longer contingent
on that action (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Thus, the areas
identified in the present study most likely pertain to associative
learning processes related to the encoding of action–outcome
and not stimulus–response associations. This possibility is also
supported by previous studies implicating neurons in these areas
in discriminating between different action–outcome associa-
tions (Matsumoto et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2003), exhibiting
sensitivity to reinforcer devaluation during reward-based action
selection (Valentin et al., 2007), and showing increased activity
during the perception of a response–reward contingency com-
pared with when no contingency is perceived (Tricomi et al.,
2004).
To conclude, the present results highlight the brain systems
involved in the adaptive control of behavior in humans. Activity
in a network of brain regions including medial prefrontal cortex,
medial orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsomedial striatumwas found
to track changes in objective contingency. These findings in hu-
mans show remarkable parallels to previous results implicating
medial frontal and dorsomedial striatum in mediating similar
functions in the rodent brain (Balleine andDickinson, 1998; Kill-
cross and Coutureau, 2003; Yin et al., 2005; Balleine et al., 2008).
Indeed, this similarity between species appears to lead to the im-
portant conclusion that the brain systems involved in controlling
goal-directed action selection are heavily conserved across mam-
malian species.
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